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In Defence of Objective Bayesianism$
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Jon Williamson

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199228003

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199228003.001.0001

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(p.1) 1 Introduction
In Defence of Objective Bayesianism

Jon Williamson (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

The chapter begins in §1.1 with an informal and intuitive introduction to objective Bayesianism as the view that an agent's degrees of belief should be probabilitiesj and should respect constraints imposed by empirical evidence, but should otherwise equivocate between basic propositions. This is followed in §1.2 by an outline of the positive claims of the book and in §1.3 by an overview of the key challenges and objections faced by objective Bayesianism, and pointers to where in the book each of these objections are met. Then, §1.4 sets out some of the key assumptions of the book concerning an agent's evidence, her language, and rationality.

Keywords:   probability, calibration, equivocation, evidence, language, rationality

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