In §2.3, objective Bayesianism was characterized by appealing to the norms of Probability, Calibration and Equivocation. This chapter encounters some of the motivation behind this characterization. We see that each norm can be justified by showing that the norm must hold if degrees of belief are to do what we require of them. The betting interpretation of belief is introduced, in §3.1., 3.2 explains the standard betting justification of the Probability Sect.3.3.discusses the formulation of the Calibration norm and presents its justification in terms of long‐run bets §.3.4 presents a justification of the Equivocation norm that appeals to considerations of caution. Finally, §3.5 argues that these epistemological norms are not some voluntary code of conduct but are forced upon us by the uses to which the strengths of our beliefs are put.
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