The goal of this chapter is to respond to a criticism of objective Bayesianism that concerns the updating of degrees of belief. Objective Bayesianism has often been dismissed on account of differences between its form of updating and Bayesian conditionalization (§4.1)—such that such differences in fact count against Bayesian conditionalization and that conditionalization can.only safely be used where its results agree with those of objective Bayesian updating.are rehearsed in §4.3 several well‐known criticisms of conditionalization The chapter then goes on to dismiss two justifications of conditionalization §4.4 we consider the dynamic Dutch book argument for conditionalization and offers a reduction against dynamic Dutch book arguments in general. In §4.5.we examine the argument for conditionalization that appeals to stability of conditional probabilities, show that this argument fails to offer a justification of conditionalization where it disagrees with objective Bayesian updating. Overall, conditionalization compares poorly with objective Bayesian updating (§4.6).
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