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In Defence of Objective Bayesianism$
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Jon Williamson

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199228003

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199228003.001.0001

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Judgement Aggregation

Judgement Aggregation

(p.136) 8 Judgement Aggregation
In Defence of Objective Bayesianism

Jon Williamson (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Section. 8.1 introduces the problem of judgement aggregation and some of the difficulties encountered in trying to solve this problem. Section. 8.2 introduces the theory of belief revision and merging and Pigozzi's application of this theory to judgement aggregation. Section. 8.3 argues that judgements should not be merged directly; rather, one should merge the evidence on which the judgements are based. Given this merged evidence, objective Bayesianism and decision theory can be used to derive an appropriate set of judgements—the resulting judgements should be viewed as the aggregate of the judgements of the original individuals (§8.4).

Keywords:   judgement aggregation, belief revision, belief merging

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