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In Defence of Objective Bayesianism$
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Jon Williamson

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199228003

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199228003.001.0001

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Languages and Relativity

Languages and Relativity

(p.148) 9 Languages and Relativity
In Defence of Objective Bayesianism

Jon Williamson (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Having developed objective Bayesianism on propositional and predicate languages, this chapter turns, in §9.1, to a richer language, the language of the mathematical theory of probability. We see that while we gain in expressibility we lose in terms of logical structure and that this can make the Equivocation norm harder to apply. Section. 9.2 responds to the objection that objective Bayesian probability suffers from a pathological relativity to the agent's language: it is by no means clear that such relativity as there is, is pathological. Similarly, we see in §9.3 that although objective Bayesianism is open to the charge of subjectivity in some cases, it is no pathological kind of subjectivity. Moreover, the relativity of objective Bayesian probability to an agent's evidence and language can in principle be eliminated, leading to an ultimate belief notion of probability.

Keywords:   mathematical probability, language relativity, language invariance, subjectivity, objectivity

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