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Charles Travis

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199230334

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230334.001.0001

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Meaning's Role in Truth

Meaning's Role in Truth

(p.94) 3 Meaning's Role in Truth

Charles Travis (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

There is a widespread view of truth, tracing back at least to Frege, on which we may say all there is to say about what truth is without so much as mentioning words. This chapter shows that this view is wrong. It argues that what words mean plays a role in fixing when they would be true; but not an exhaustive one. Meaning leaves room for variation in truth conditions from one speaking to another. What that non-exhaustive role is depends on what it is to have said what is true. Identification of the aspect of truth which fixes this role will collapse the widespread view.

Keywords:   Frege, truth conditions, meaning, words

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