Truth matters to all those capable of thinking falsely (so of thinking things); but to philosophers in a special way. Philosophers have spoken volumes on the topic. One such example is Michael Dummett's early essay, ‘Truth’, where he defends two intuitions. The first is that no statement could be neither true nor false; or it could never be right to say so. The second is that it is not so of every statement that it is guaranteed to be either true or false. Each has its exponents. Few, though, defend both. If both are right, that may argue for a view dubbed sublunary intuitionism: in an important sense (though one yet to be clarified) the logic of ordinary discourse is intuitionist, not classical. This chapter argues that Dummett's first intuition is incorrect. His second intuition stands on a more radical, perhaps more simple-minded, reading than he gives it. But it is the tension between the two intuitions, if anything, that argues for sublunary intuitionism. Neither alone makes the case.
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.