Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Saving Truth From Paradox$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Hartry Field

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199230747

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230747.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 29 November 2020

A Second Interlude on Vagueness

A Second Interlude on Vagueness

(p.150) 9 A Second Interlude on Vagueness
Saving Truth From Paradox

Hartry Field (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter discusses the attempt to make sense of the notion of a question having no determinate answer within a classical-logic framework. It focuses in part on supervaluationism, especially the version that does not identify truth with super-truth but instead takes super-truth to define a notion of determinate truth. The chapter is sceptical of the philosophical payoff of supervaluationism and other classical-logic approaches to indeterminacy.

Keywords:   indeterminacy, supervaluationism, super-truth, determinate truth, classical-logic

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .