Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
DisjunctivismPerception, Action, Knowledge$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199231546

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 28 November 2020

In Defence of Disjunctivism

In Defence of Disjunctivism

(p.311) 13 In Defence of Disjunctivism

Ram Neta

Oxford University Press

McDowell has offered a particular epistemological argument in favour of one version of disjunctivism about perception. This argument has been prominently criticized by Crispin Wright, and the conclusion of the argument has been prominently criticized by Mark Johnston. This chapter rebuts both of those criticisms.

Keywords:   McDowell, epistemology, perception, Crispin Wright, Mark Johnston

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .