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DisjunctivismPerception, Action, Knowledge$
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Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199231546

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.001.0001

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Perceptual‐Recognitional Abilities and Perceptual Knowledge

Perceptual‐Recognitional Abilities and Perceptual Knowledge

(p.330) 14 Perceptual‐Recognitional Abilities and Perceptual Knowledge

Alan Millar (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter presents a conception of recognitional abilities and perceptual-discriminative abilities to make sense of how perceptual experiences make it possible to have cognitive contact with objects and facts. It is argued that accepting the emerging view does not commit one to the claim that perceptual experiences are essentially relational, as they are conceived to be in disjunctivist theories. The discussion explores some implications for the theory of knowledge in general. In particular, it considers how we can shed light on the nature of knowledge if we do not aim to provide a conceptual analysis of knowledge in terms of true belief plus something else. Consideration is also given to how best to make sense of the practical value that knowledge has.

Keywords:   disjunctivism, perception, abilities, recognition, perceptual-recognitional abilities, experience, knowledge

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