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DisjunctivismPerception, Action, Knowledge$
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Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199231546

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.001.0001

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(p.57) 2 Either/Or

Alex Byrne

Heather Logue

Oxford University Press

This chapter surveys the varieties of disjunctivism concerning perceptual experience. Disjunctivism comes in two main flavours: metaphysical and epistemological. Metaphysical disjunctivism is the view usually associated with the disjunctivist label. After some initial discussion of (metaphysical) disjunctivism, epistemological disjunctivism is explained. The rest of the chapter is solely concerned with explaining and assessing metaphysical disjunctivism, a theory of the nature of perceptual experience. The main conclusion is that although there is considerable insight in the vicinity, metaphysical disjunctivism is false.

Keywords:   disjunctivism, experience, metaphysics, epistemology, perception

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