Against Disjunctivism
Against Disjunctivism
This chapter formulates and argues for a version of the causal theory of perception that is incompatible with disjunctivism, and defends it against criticisms typically levelled at such a theory by disjunctivists, such as that it promotes scepticism and that it is unfaithful to the phenomenology of perception. It argues that far from disjunctivism being ontologically less extravagant than that causal theory of perception, the reverse is true, so that all things considered, the causal theory of perception is the superior theory and disjunctivism in the philosophy of perception should be rejected.
Keywords: causal theory, perception, scepticism, disjunctivists
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