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DisjunctivismPerception, Action, Knowledge$
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Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199231546

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 28 November 2020

How to Account for Illusion

How to Account for Illusion

(p.168) 6 How to Account for Illusion

Bill Brewer (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Early modern empiricists think of perceptual experience as the presentation of an object to a subject. Phenomena of illusion suggest that such objects must be mind dependent things. Alternatively, perceptual experience may be characterized instead in terms of its representational content (this is the Content View). In that case, illusion is simply false perceptual content. This chapter argues that the early modern empiricists had a key insight: the idea that the core subjective character of perceptual experience to be given by citing the object presented is more fundamental than any appeal to perceptual content, and can account for illusion, and indeed hallucination, without resorting to the problematic postulation of any mind-independent objects distinct from the mind-independent physical objects we all know and love (this is the Object View). It is also suggested that the Object View provides a more promising context for the basic commitments of disjunctivism than the current orthodoxy of the Content View.

Keywords:   disjunctivism, experience, perception, hallucination, representation, content

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