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Grounding ConceptsAn Empirical Basis for Arithmetical Knowledge$
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C. S. Jenkins

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199231577

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231577.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 03 December 2021

Other Objections

Other Objections

(p.236) 9 Other Objections
Grounding Concepts

Caroline Jenkins (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter considers objections to the proposal of the second part of the book which are not simply objections to the claim that our arithmetical concepts are empirically grounded. These include some objections that might be generated by a broadly Quinean outlook, a circularity worry (which are related here to the Wittgensteinian notion of ‘deep nonsense’), and a number of issues concerning the epistemic step from possession of concepts to belief in conceptually true propositions. The chapter also discusses in some detail the objection that, by definition, arithmetical knowledge cannot be a priori if it is empirical.

Keywords:   Quine, Wittgenstein, deep nonsense, circularity, a priori, empirical, true propositions

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