This final chapter is concerned with the relevance of the current project to other areas of philosophy, and some ways in which the ideas discussed warrant further research. Among other things, it argues that the notion of empirical grounding for concepts suggests a new way to defend the position known as empirical foundationalism, and points to an empiricist theory of meaningfulness which (unlike the logical positivists' version) considers the relation between sensory input and concepts (rather than that between experience and propositions) to be of primary importance. The possibility of a novel defence of the correspondence intuition in the theory of truth is also raised. The chapter concludes with some larger-scale reflections on the significance of the book's main thesis.
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