Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Grounding ConceptsAn Empirical Basis for Arithmetical Knowledge$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

C. S. Jenkins

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199231577

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231577.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 20 October 2021

On The Very Idea of Concept Grounding: Thinking Too Big

On The Very Idea of Concept Grounding: Thinking Too Big

(p.205) 7 On The Very Idea of Concept Grounding: Thinking Too Big
Grounding Concepts

Caroline Jenkins (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter focuses on objections to the claim that arithmetical concepts are empirically grounded. It argues that the most common form of objection to projects of this type is based upon a failure to appreciate that it is even possible that empirical input grounds our arithmetical concepts. It traces this view through an illustrative selection of influential philosophers: Kant, C. I. Lewis, Ayer, Quine, and Fodor.

Keywords:   Thinking Too Big, Objections, Kant, C. I. Lewis, Ayer, Quine, Fodor

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .