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Grounding ConceptsAn Empirical Basis for Arithmetical Knowledge$
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C. S. Jenkins

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199231577

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231577.001.0001

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More on the Very Idea of Concept Grounding

More on the Very Idea of Concept Grounding

(p.220) 8 More on the Very Idea of Concept Grounding
Grounding Concepts

Caroline Jenkins (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter discusses objections to the idea that arithmetical concepts have empirical grounding, other than those covered in the previous chapter. These include some objections derived from McDowell, and some arguments to the effect that arithmetical concepts are too rich to be grounded in sensory input. One such argument appeals to certain results in empirical psychology which purport to show that arithmetical concepts (or even knowledge) are innate. It argues that the question of innateness is at best tangential to my project, since the origin of a concept and its epistemic status are distinct issues.

Keywords:   objections, McDowell, innateness, psychology, concepts, empiricism

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