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MindmeldingConsciousness, Neuroscience, and the Mind's Privacy$
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William Hirstein

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199231904

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231904.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 22 January 2022

Disentangling self and consciousness

Disentangling self and consciousness

(p.190) Chapter 11 Disentangling self and consciousness

William Hirstein

Oxford University Press

This chapter shows that mindmelding is metaphysically possible, i.e., that it does not violate any laws governing the metaphysical nature of reality. Metaphysical issues are fundamental and lie at the core of the most difficult parts of the problems of privacy and the mind-body problem itself. There is nothing stopping us from placing the idea of mindmelding on clear, unproblematic, and plausible metaphysical foundations. It is argued that the position of privacy is the one on shaky metaphysical grounds. Two metaphysical theses are examined: the thesis of privacy, and the idea that all conscious states must have a subject, which is called ‘inseparability’ because it posits that the subject is inseparable from the conscious state.

Keywords:   privacy, mental states, mindmelding, metaphysics, conscious states, inseparability

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