Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Truth in Virtue of MeaningA Defence of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Gillian Russell

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199232192

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232192.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 23 November 2020

The ‘in virtue of’ Relation

The ‘in virtue of’ Relation

Chapter:
(p.29) 1 The ‘in virtue of’ Relation
Source:
Truth in Virtue of Meaning
Author(s):

Gillian Russell (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232192.003.0002

In Carnap and Logical Truth, Quine argued that it was always either trivial or absurd to say that a sentence was true in virtue of meaning, and his argument has been revived in recent times by Boghossian. This chapter responds to these arguments by proposing a particular disambiguation of the ‘in virtue of’ expression. It is also argued that it would be a mistake to equate analytic sentences with those that express necessary truths.

Keywords:   Quine, two-factor argument, Boghossian, in virtue of, determination, necessity, substantive necessity, contingent analytic

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .