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Truth in Virtue of MeaningA Defence of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction$
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Truth in Virtue of Meaning: A Defence of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction

Gillian Russell

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199232192

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232192.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 20 October 2021

Definitions

Definitions

Chapter:
(p.143) 5 Definitions
Source:
Truth in Virtue of Meaning
Author(s):

Gillian Russell (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232192.003.0006

Definitions have often thought to be crucial to the debate over the analytic/synthetic distinction. They have seemed to provide clear examples of synonymy which are well-entrenched in scientific and mathematical practice. This chapter re-examines the properties of definitions in the light of our rejection of the Language Myth. The resulting account allows us both to explain Quine's sometimes puzzling views on definition, and to defend the analytic/synthetic distinction against his doctrine of the transience of definition.

Keywords:   reference determiner, content, Quine, Language Myth, character, synonymy, transience of definition, notational abbreviation, semantic externalism, postulation

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