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Truth in Virtue of MeaningA Defence of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction$
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Gillian Russell

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199232192

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232192.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 03 December 2021

Analytic Justification

Analytic Justification

(p.195) 7 Analytic Justification
Truth in Virtue of Meaning

Gillian Russell (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

It is largely because of the anticipated a priori status of analytic truths that philosophers have been interested in analyticity, but the existence of a priori justification is itself a difficult topic. This chapter explores the epistemological significance of analyticity. It examines three theories of analytic justification, (while remaining neutral about whether or not that analytic justification can be considered a kind of a priori justification), and uses the failures of the first two to motivate acceptance of the third.

Keywords:   a priori, analytic justification, semantic competence, deference, division of labour, knowledge of logic

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