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The Mind in Nature$
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C. B. Martin

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199234103

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234103.001.0001

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The Mind in Nature: A New View of the Mind

The Mind in Nature: A New View of the Mind

(p.177) 15 The Mind in Nature: A New View of the Mind
The Mind in Nature

C. B. Martin (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter argues that the human organism is not a mental agent capable of understanding, feeling, and knowing through the uses under the governance of the autonomic nervous system. The human organism is such an agent through the uses under the governance only of the central nervous system. The distinction is not to be made in terms of degrees of complexity, but rather in terms of the difference in the material of use, namely, sensory input, feedback, and imagery. Propositional attitudes of belief, desire, hope, fear, frustration, etc., are collections of dispositional state arrays whose typifying manifestations take the form of multifarious modes of use of various forms of sensation and imagery. Progress in the philosophy of mind has been impeded by poverty-stricken accounts of percepts and percept-like imagery, often enough due to the dead hands of Wittgenstein and Ryle.

Keywords:   human organism, central nervous system, sensate materials, dispositions, dispositionality

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