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Relative Truth$
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Manuel García-Carpintero and Max Kölbel

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199234950

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234950.001.0001

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Moderate Relativism

Moderate Relativism

(p.41) 2 Moderate Relativism
Relative Truth

François Recanati (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter discusses two classical objections to the view that the content of a tensed utterance is a ‘temporal proposition’, true relative to certain times and false relative to others. The first objection, due to Frege, is the objection from incompleteness. In response, it is argued that the (complete) content of a representation is distributed over its explicit content and the circumstance with respect to which that content is to be evaluated. As a result, the explicit content (lekton) need not be fully propositional; it may determine only relative truth-conditions. The second objection is due to Mark Richard, who claimed that temporal propositions cannot be the object of propositional attitudes such as belief. It is argued that that argument can be resisted if one distinguishes two aspects in a belief and, correlatively, two interpretations for a belief report. The last section of the chapter briefly discusses ‘faultless disagreement’.

Keywords:   semantic incompleteness, Frege, Austinian proposition, relativism, temporalism, temporal propositions, propositional attitudes, eternalism, faultless disagreement, narrow content

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