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Relative Truth$
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Manuel García-Carpintero and Max Kölbel

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199234950

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234950.001.0001

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Semantic Relativism and the Logic of Indexicals

Semantic Relativism and the Logic of Indexicals

(p.63) 3 Semantic Relativism and the Logic of Indexicals
Relative Truth

Stefano Predelli (Contributor Webpage)

Isidora Stojanovic

Oxford University Press

This chapter aims at defending semantic relativism from a general methodological viewpoint. In the classic non-relativistic approach, the parameters relevant for the interpretation of indexical expressions coincide with the parameters involved in the definition of truth. It is argued that this identification is grounded on an illicit confusion between genuinely semantic (and hence logical) considerations on the one hand, and issues pertaining to the use of language on the other. Certain characteristic semantic consequences of relativism are then taken into consideration, and are contrasted with the logical outcomes of the classic, non-relativistic treatment of indexical languages.

Keywords:   semantics, relativism, truth, logic

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