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Relative Truth$
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Manuel García-Carpintero and Max Kölbel

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199234950

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234950.001.0001

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Relativism about Truth Itself: Haphazard Thoughts about the Very Idea

Relativism about Truth Itself: Haphazard Thoughts about the Very Idea

(p.157) 7 Relativism about Truth Itself: Haphazard Thoughts about the Very Idea
Relative Truth

Crispin Wright (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

The setting of relativistic ideas about truth in the general style of semantic-theoretic apparatus pioneered by Lewis, Kaplan, and others has persuaded many that they should at least be taken seriously as competition in the space of explanatory linguistic theory, a type of view which, properly formulated, may offer an at least coherent — and indeed, in the view of some, a superior — account of certain salient linguistic data manifest in, for example, discourse about epistemic modals, knowledge, and about matters of taste and value, and may also offer the prospect of a coherent regimentation of the Aristotelian ‘Open Future’ (along with, perhaps, the Dummettian ‘anti-real’ past). This chapter enters a reminder of certain underlying, more purely philosophical issues about relativism — about its metaphysical coherence, its metasemantic obligations, and about the apparent limitations of the kind of local linguistic evidence which contemporary proponents have adduced in its favour — of which there is a risk that its apparent rehabilitation in rigorous semantic dress may encourage neglect.

Keywords:   protagoreanism, contextualism, representationality, context of assessment

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