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Relative Truth$
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Manuel García-Carpintero and Max Kölbel

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199234950

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234950.001.0001

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Assertion, Belief and Disagreement: A Problem for Truth‐Relativism

Assertion, Belief and Disagreement: A Problem for Truth‐Relativism

(p.207) 9 Assertion, Belief and Disagreement: A Problem for Truth‐Relativism
Relative Truth

Sebastiano Moruzzi (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter argues that MacFarlane's truth-relativism faces two problems. First, it cannot explain the existence of disputes over assessment-sensitive propositions because it does not have a viable notion of disagreement. Second, it entails the idea that knowledge of the truth-relativist thesis in the context of a dispute is dialectically inhibiting: the truth relativist is committed to an ignorance theory, for the speakers who take part, to a dispute on matters of taste.

Keywords:   disagreement, faultlessness, dispute, truth-relativism, assertion, belief, pragmatic self-refutation

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