Moral Evaluation and Conceptual Analysis in Jurisprudential Methodology
Moral Evaluation and Conceptual Analysis in Jurisprudential Methodology
Analytic general jurisprudence has become increasingly attentive to its own methodology in recent years. No longer content with its traditional first-order questions revolving around the varieties, commitments, and defensibility of legal positivism, the discipline of jurisprudence has raised a second-order methodological question: How should one do jurisprudence? This chapter introduces the methodology debate, draws attention to the merits and shortcomings of various positions already staked out, and contributes to the debate by defending the claims that moral evaluation has a modest role in analysing the concept of law and that conceptual analysis, or rather, many of its incarnations, is defensible and indeed inescapable in jurisprudence.
Keywords: jurisprudence, moral evaluation, conceptual analysis
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