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Law and Philosophy$
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Michael Freeman and Ross Harrison

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199237159

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199237159.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 03 March 2021

Objectivity and Value: Legal Arguments and the Fallibility of Judges

Objectivity and Value: Legal Arguments and the Fallibility of Judges

(p.76) 5 Objectivity and Value: Legal Arguments and the Fallibility of Judges
Law and Philosophy

Stephen Guest

Oxford University Press

This chapter begins with a discussion of the nature of truth, the sociology and objectivity of value, moral judgements as skill, social practices and objectivity, and objectivity in law. It then analyses some recent comments made by Lord Bingham, the senior law lord and former Chief Justice of England, who claimed that there are no right answers to legal questions. It is argued that he, and others who share his view, are wrong. This is partly because they underestimate the vitality in the assumption that their ultimate judgements might be fallible, and because they do not sufficiently appreciate how legal argument is a different skill from rhetoric, where ‘being correct’ is of little, if any, importance.

Keywords:   truth, moral judgements, social practices, Lord Bingham

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