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Law and Philosophy$
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Michael Freeman and Ross Harrison

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199237159

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199237159.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 01 March 2021

An Epistemic Account of the Internal Point of View

An Epistemic Account of the Internal Point of View

(p.118) 7 An Epistemic Account of the Internal Point of View
Law and Philosophy

Antony Hatzistavrou

Oxford University Press

This chapter presents an epistemic account of the internal point of view. It argues that to have the internal point of view towards law is to be epistemically guided by law and especially by the rule of recognition. The chapter is divided in the four parts. The first part argues contra Shapiro that Hart accepts a variety of motives for one's conformity, which do not include the consideration that a legal rule applies. The second part argues contra Holton that the inconsistency in Hart's account of the internal point of view arises only on Holton's assumption that the internal point of view has motivational clout and that this assumption is ungrounded. The third part constructs an account of the internal point of view on which it provides only epistemic guidance. Finally, the fourth part explains how, on the proposed account, the internal point of view is distinguished from the external point of view.

Keywords:   law, rule of recognition, Shapiro, Hart, Holton

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