An Epistemic Account of the Internal Point of View
An Epistemic Account of the Internal Point of View
This chapter presents an epistemic account of the internal point of view. It argues that to have the internal point of view towards law is to be epistemically guided by law and especially by the rule of recognition. The chapter is divided in the four parts. The first part argues contra Shapiro that Hart accepts a variety of motives for one's conformity, which do not include the consideration that a legal rule applies. The second part argues contra Holton that the inconsistency in Hart's account of the internal point of view arises only on Holton's assumption that the internal point of view has motivational clout and that this assumption is ungrounded. The third part constructs an account of the internal point of view on which it provides only epistemic guidance. Finally, the fourth part explains how, on the proposed account, the internal point of view is distinguished from the external point of view.
Keywords: law, rule of recognition, Shapiro, Hart, Holton
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