Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Welfare to WorkConditional Rights in Social Policy$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Amir Paz-Fuchs

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199237418

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199237418.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 18 January 2022

Welfare-to-Work Programmes Under the Poor Laws

Welfare-to-Work Programmes Under the Poor Laws

Chapter:
(p.66) 2 Welfare-to-Work Programmes Under the Poor Laws
Source:
Welfare to Work
Author(s):

Amir Paz-Fuchs

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199237418.003.0003

Contemporary programmes are replete with themes and rationales that are similar to those of the Poor Law era. For this reason, the socio-legal history of the poor laws provides an introduction to the institutions, themes, and rationales of welfare-to-work, descendants of which may be detected today. This chapter argues that at different points in time (and sometimes simultaneously), four different rationales can be detected in Poor Law programmes: deterrence, economics, morality, and quid-pro-quo. These rationales are all realized through the same common goal: that of conditionality. And yet, each rationale derives from a distinct vision of the relationship between the individual and the state and thus has a different impact on the emphasis of welfare programmes.

Keywords:   legal history, unemployed, deterrence, economic rationales, morality of welfare, quid-pro-quo, conditionality

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .