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Hegelian Metaphysics$
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Robert Stern

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780199239108

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239108.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 17 September 2021

Peirce on Hegel: Nominalist or Realist?

Peirce on Hegel: Nominalist or Realist?

(p.239) 8 Peirce on Hegel: Nominalist or Realist?
Hegelian Metaphysics

Robert Stern (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter considers one of Peirce's criticisms of Hegel, namely, that Hegel was a nominalist. The nature of this criticism is explored, particularly in the light of another of Peirce's claims about Hegel, viz. that he was overcommitted to what Peirce calls ‘Thirdness’, where it is then prima facie puzzling how Hegel can have both faults, as the latter involves a kind of realism about generality or universals which nominalists characteristically reject. The chapter then considers the justice of Peirce's criticism, where it is argued that the criticism is unwarranted, and that in some respects it is curious to find Peirce making it at all, when he could just as easily have treated Hegel as an ally in his struggle against nominalism.

Keywords:   nominalism, realism, Thirdness, universals

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