In his well-known criticisms of the uses of the terms Gestalt and Ganzheit in the 1930s, Moritz Schlick argues that there is no ontological difference between sums on the one hand and Ganzheiten on the other, but simply a difference between two modes of representation of the same objects, so it is not possible for Ganzheit theorists to use the opposition to distinguish two kinds of object, mere sums or aggregates on the one hand, and the essentially different (and usually more interesting) unities, wholes, or totalities on the other. That the distinction between sums and non-sums — known as complexes — is an ontological one may be seen by comparing their existence conditions. For sums these are minimal: the sum exists just when all the constituent parts exist. By contrast, a complex constituted of the same parts as the sum only exists if a further constitutive condition is fulfilled.
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.