Some time around their first birthday most infants begin to engage in behaviour that is designed to bring it about — by means of pointing or gaze-following, for instance — that their own and another person's attention are focused on the same object. The capacity for joint attention, as manifested in such behaviour, has become the subject of intensive research among developmentalists and primatologists over the past decade. More recently, work on joint attention has also begun to attract the attention of philosophers. This book brings together, for the first time, philosophical and psychologica ... More

Some time around their first birthday most infants begin to engage in behaviour that is designed to bring it about — by means of pointing or gaze-following, for instance — that their own and another person's attention are focused on the same object. The capacity for joint attention, as manifested in such behaviour, has become the subject of intensive research among developmentalists and primatologists over the past decade. More recently, work on joint attention has also begun to attract the attention of philosophers. This book brings together, for the first time, philosophical and psychological perspectives on the nature and significance of the phenomenon, addressing issues such as: How should we explain the kind of mutual openness that joint attention seems to involve? What sort of grip on one's own and other people's mental states does such joint attention involve, and how does it relate to later-emerging ‘theory of mind’ abilities? What is the role of joint attention in communication? In what sense, if any, is the capacity to engage in joint attention with others unique to humans? How should we explain autistic children's seeming incapacity to engage in joint attention? What role, if any, does affect play in the achievement of joint attention?