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Good Knowledge, Bad KnowledgeOn Two Dogmas of Epistemology$
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Stephen Hetherington

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780199247349

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247349.001.0001

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Epistemic absolutism

Epistemic absolutism

(p.1) 1 Epistemic absolutism
Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge

Stephen Hetherington

Oxford University Press

The last thing the author wishes to do as an epistemologist is to accept an invidious relativism. In one respect, however, epistemology has become too absolutist. This chapter identifies that kind of absolutism and begins the argument against it. Rejecting it has many epistemological benefits, and the existence of those benefits is the main reason why epistemic absolutism should be discarded. Another reason is that to spurn epistemic absolutism is to respect how many of us carefully yet ordinarily — independently of having become immersed in contemporary epistemology — use this concept of knowledge.

Keywords:   knowledge, relativism, epistemic absolutism

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