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Good Knowledge, Bad KnowledgeOn Two Dogmas of Epistemology$
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Stephen Hetherington

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780199247349

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247349.001.0001

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Minimal knowledge

Minimal knowledge

(p.108) 4 Minimal knowledge
Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge

Stephen Hetherington

Oxford University Press

Chapters 2 and 3 alert us to some of the explanatory potential in distinguishing between better knowledge that p and worse knowledge that p — that is, in rejecting epistemic absolutism. Indeed, Chapter 3 shows that some knowledge that p can be quite poor indeed (qua knowledge that p). But at least in principle, is it possible for there to be even worse knowledge still? In principle, how poorly can a fact be known? This chapter argues that even if knowledge is required to be at least a true belief, it need not be a justified true belief. It further argues that justificationism is false — that knowledge need not include either internalist justification (such as evidence) or externalist justification (such as the property of having been formed reliably).

Keywords:   knowledge, epistemic absolutism, justificationism

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