Chapters 2 and 3 alert us to some of the explanatory potential in distinguishing between better knowledge that p and worse knowledge that p — that is, in rejecting epistemic absolutism. Indeed, Chapter 3 shows that some knowledge that p can be quite poor indeed (qua knowledge that p). But at least in principle, is it possible for there to be even worse knowledge still? In principle, how poorly can a fact be known? This chapter argues that even if knowledge is required to be at least a true belief, it need not be a justified true belief. It further argues that justificationism is false — that knowledge need not include either internalist justification (such as evidence) or externalist justification (such as the property of having been formed reliably).
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