Cognitive Significance Regained
Cognitive Significance Regained
This chapter aims to arrest the slide to pragmatic empiricism with its holistic pessimism over the prospect of ever being able to demarcate the empirically meaningful from the metaphysically meaningless. It proposes a criterion of cognitive significance that distinguishes those sentences that depend for their truth and falsity on understanding and experience and those that do not. It argues that this criterion is itself of considerable significance even if it were to be criticized as presupposing too extreme an idealization of the logical shape of actual scientific endeavours.
Keywords: pragmatic empiricism, holistic pessimism, cognitive significance, truth, meaning
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