The Realism Debate
The Realism Debate
This chapter provides a comprehensive survey of concepts and issues concerning the realism debate. It explains that realism comes in two basic varieties: realism about things and realism about truth. Truth comes in different kinds, but the least committal, philosophy neutral kind is the so-called minimal truth. The demands on minimal truth are platitudinous, ore requirements of bare material adequacy. This chapter also discusses the platitudes of normativity, the platitude of representation, and the central platitude.
Keywords: realism, truth, minimal truth, normativity, representation
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