Truth as Knowable
Truth as Knowable
This chapter argues in defence of the principle of knowability against a major realist attack on it, specifically it looks at philosopher Frederick Fitch's claims that there could be truths that are in principle unknowable. It proposes a reformulation of the moderate anti-realist tenet that every truth is knowable in principle to ensure that it will survive against realist criticisms. This defensive groundwork for semantic anti-realism mobilizes what are believed to the new and interesting resources.
Keywords: knowability, Frederick Fitch, truth, anti-realism, unknowable
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