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Intellectual VirtuePerspectives from Ethics and Epistemology$
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Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780199252732

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252732.001.0001

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How to be a Virtue Epistemologist

How to be a Virtue Epistemologist

Chapter:
(p.183) 8 How to be a Virtue Epistemologist
Source:
Intellectual Virtue
Author(s):

Christopher Hookway (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252732.003.0009

This chapter points out that standard versions of virtue epistemology accept and are motivated by the same central problems in epistemology — such as analyzing the concepts of knowledge and justification, and addressing skeptical challenges — which motivate contemporary epistemology. The only significant difference is that virtue epistemology claims that the concepts of knowledge and justification must be analyzed in terms of virtues. What motivates virtue ethicists, however, is not what is motivating other ethicists. The contemporary census amongst ethicists has a different set of problems than the ones motivating virtue ethicists. Virtue epistemologists should mount a similar challenge to their contemporaries: instead of focusing on static states such as beliefs and evaluating whether or not they are justified, they should focus their efforts on evaluating and regulating the activities of inquiry and deliberation, and the role which virtues play in such evaluation and regulation.

Keywords:   epistemic norms, epistemic virtue, Gettier problem, Christopher Hookway, reliabilist, responsibilist, virtue epistemology, virtue ethics, epistemic evaluation, well-conducted inquiry

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