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Markets, Morals, and the Law$
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Jules L. Coleman

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780199253609

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199253609.001.0001

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(p.277) 11. Unanimity
Markets, Morals, and the Law

Jules L. Coleman

Oxford University Press

This chapter explores the view that, on both economic and moral grounds, unanimity is the preferable voting rule. Unanimity captures the essential Paretian and consensual features of market exchange, and is thus uniquely defensible on both market and moral grounds. Departures from unanimity are unavoidable but must be seen as necessary evils. The usual criticism of unanimity is that it unjustifiably favors the status quo. The chapter asks whether unanimity actually bears the relationship to market exchange that its proponents take to justify it uniquely.

Keywords:   unanimity, market exchange, resource allocation, Pareto optimality, welfare economics, political association, market failure

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