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Dispositions$
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Stephen Mumford

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780199259823

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199259823.001.0001

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Eliminativism and Reductionism

Eliminativism and Reductionism

Chapter:
(p.170) 8 Eliminativism and Reductionism
Source:
Dispositions
Author(s):

Stephen Mumford

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199259823.003.0008

This chapter considers the different positions and proposes a new form of monism. It explores the different claims of the eliminativist and reductionist responses and provides some assessment to their relative merits. The second section of this chapter presents the varieties of property monism: categorical reductionism, dispositional reductionism, categorical reductionism, categorical eliminativism, and dispositional eliminativism. The third and fourth sections consider the case for and against eliminativism. What essentially distinguishes an eliminativist position from a reductionist one is a denial of identities between dispositional and categorical properties. The fifth section assesses the arguments for reductionism. The sixth section suggests a monism without reductionism.

Keywords:   property monism, eliminativism, reductionism, categorical reductionism, categorical eliminativism, dispositional eliminativism, Quine

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