Locke's response to the Inconsistent Triad is to reject (II), the claim that physical objects are the direct objects of perception. This leads to his indirect realism on which perceptual experiences have mind-dependent direct objects but nevertheless may present mind-independent physical objects if these are the sufficiently resembling causes of experiences with the direct objects in question. As Berkeley contends, it is argued here that the required resemblance with mind-dependent direct objects is incompatible with the mind-independence of physical objects themselves. The indirect realist rejection of (II) is inconsistent with the pre-theoretic intuition that we are presented with mind-independent physical objects in perception in such a way as to provide us with at least a rough and provisional conception of what such objects are.
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