The Content View
The Content View
The orthodox contemporary reaction to the Inconsistent Triad is to reject (III), the claim that the direct objects of perception are mind-dependent, by denying that there are any direct objects of perception in the early modern sense that is the defining context for this key notion throughout. Instead of regarding perceptual experience as acquaintance with particular entities whose identity and nature characterize the experience in question as the specific conscious occurrence that it is, our fundamental perceptual relation with the world is to be characterized instead in terms of perceptual content: the way perceptual experience represents things as being in the world around the subject. It is argued that the resultant position, (CV), faces serious problems in accounting for illusion and hallucination that in turn bring out its failure satisfactorily to reconfigure the phenomenon of the perceptual experiential presentation of particular mind-independent physical objects outside the early modern framework. This fatal flaw of (CV) derives from its defining commitments to the possibility of falsity and the generality of predication in its most basic account of our perceptual relation with the physical world.
Keywords: content, object, illusion, hallucination, falsity, generality, presentation
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