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Perception and its Objects$
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Bill Brewer

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199260256

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199260256.001.0001

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(p.138) 6 Epistemology
Perception and its Objects

Bill Brewer (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

The focus is epistemological. (OV) has certain features that may provoke concerns under the head of the Myth of the Given. An initial challenge from Sellars is set out and dealt with. An extended sketch is presented of how the positive epistemology of empirical knowledge might proceed in the context of (OV). In favourable circumstances, perception constitutes as a source of knowledge, since experience acquaints us with particular mind-independent physical objects in such a way as to enable our conceptual registration of their visually relevant similarities with the paradigm exemplars of various kinds that are involved in our possession of concepts of those very kinds. Thus, in veridical cases, we may see, and thereby know, that the objects in question fall under those kinds. Various cases of error are to be handled separately. An Epistemic Priority Requirement is set out and it is explained how this account meets it.

Keywords:   Sellars, Myth of the Given, acquaintance, conceptual registration, perceptual knowledge, error, Epistemic Priority Requirement

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