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Perception and its Objects$
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Bill Brewer

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199260256

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199260256.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 06 December 2021

Realism and Explanation

Realism and Explanation

(p.160) 7 Realism and Explanation
Perception and its Objects

Bill Brewer (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

The motivation and defence of (OV) is completed by a detailed engagement with the question how the mind-independence of the physical objects that we perceive shows up from our own perspective as perceivers. Philosophical debate about the nature of the direct objects of perception is responsible at least in part to how things are from the subject's own perspective. An account is offered of the role in bringing mind-independence to light for the subject of certain commonsense explanations of the actual and counterfactual order and nature of experience of physical objects on the basis of the perceptible natures of the particular objects perceived. In virtue of their modal robustness, such explanations resist any reduction to scientific physics that might threaten to undermine the empiricist idea that physical objects themselves are genuinely presented in perception. The resulting position provides a fully adequate vindication of empirical realism.

Keywords:   mind-independence, perceiver's perspective, commonsense explanation, scientific-physics, commonsense-physics, robustness, empirical realism

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