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EpistemologyNew Essays$
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Quentin Smith

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199264933

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264933.001.0001

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Knowledge-Closure and Skepticism

Knowledge-Closure and Skepticism

(p.137) 7 Knowledge-Closure and Skepticism

Marian David

Ted A. Warfield (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter begins with some preliminary remarks about epistemic closure principles, knowledge-closure principles in particular, and the role of knowledge-closure principles in sceptical argumentation. It discusses some implausible knowledge-closure principles and identifies two key problems for such principles. The chapter then discusses more plausible knowledge-closure principles and their possible use in sceptical argumentation.

Keywords:   epistemic closure principles, implausible principles, plausible principles, closure-based sceptical arguments

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