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Agency and ResponsibilityA Common-Sense Moral Psychology$
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Jeanette Kennett

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780199266302

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266302.001.0001

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Wanting and Valuing

Wanting and Valuing

(p.72) 4 Wanting and Valuing
Agency and Responsibility

Jeanette Kennett

Oxford University Press

This chapter describes Gary Watson's view of human psychology and the account of weakness which he derives from it. The chapter starts by examining an approach, rooted in the Platonic view of human psychology, which distinguishes between valuing and mere desiring. The chapter's thesis is that the evaluation cannot be understood in isolation from the notion of justification. In explicating the distinction between valuing and desiring, it focuses on deliberation itself. The latter part of the chapter examines how response-dispositional theories of value make the connection between these evaluative judgements and desire. It suggests a Kantian modification to underwrite the defeasible link between normative judgement and desire. The solution points to the rational centrality of the capacity from self-control.

Keywords:   Gary Watson, value, desire, evaluative judgements, theories of value, Kantian modification, deliberation

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