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Strategic Learning and its Limits$
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H. Peyton Young

Print publication date: 2004

Print ISBN-13: 9780199269181

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269181.001.0001

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(p.29) 3 Equilibrium
Strategic Learning and its Limits

H. Peyton Young

Oxford University Press

This chapter investigates alternative notions of both convergence and equilibrium. By studying the asymptotic behaviour of certain classes of learning dynamics, we are led to more inclusive definitions of what constitutes equilibrium behaviour in a game. The chapter begins by introducing a general concept of equilibrium that includes both Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium as special cases. It then shows that this notion of equilibrium is precisely what regret matching converges to.

Keywords:   convergence, learning, Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium

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