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Strategic Learning and its Limits$
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H. Peyton Young

Print publication date: 2004

Print ISBN-13: 9780199269181

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269181.001.0001

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Conditional No-Regret Learning

Conditional No-Regret Learning

(p.43) 4 Conditional No-Regret Learning
Strategic Learning and its Limits

H. Peyton Young

Oxford University Press

This chapter shows that there exist very simple adaptive rules that converge to the set of coarse correlated equilibria in a game. One of these procedures, regret matching, is as simple computationally as the most primitive reinforcement procedures; indeed it can be interpreted as a reinforcement procedure in which the aspiration level is historical average payoff. Somewhat more sophisticated procedures — such as incremental conditional regret matching and HM conditional regret matching with inertia — converge to the set of correlated equilibria in the game. The former rule differs from standard reinforcement procedures in that behaviour depends on payoff differences among actions, rather than on payoff differences relative to a given aspiration level. The latter rule depends only on payoff differences from the payoff of the current action; however, probabilistic behaviour may change abruptly from one period to the next instead of incrementally.

Keywords:   conditional regret, regret matching, learning, payoff

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