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Strategic Learning and its Limits$
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H. Peyton Young

Print publication date: 2004

Print ISBN-13: 9780199269181

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269181.001.0001

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Fictitious Play and Its Variants

Fictitious Play and Its Variants

(p.76) 6 Fictitious Play and Its Variants
Strategic Learning and its Limits

H. Peyton Young

Oxford University Press

This chapter examines fictitious play and its variants. These can be viewed as primitive forms of Bayesian learning in which players use simple statistical models based on past evidence and choose best (or almost best) replies given the evidence. Smoothed versions of fictitious play have long-run average behaviour that is similar to that of no regret learning, but they do not converge to Nash equilibrium except in special cases.

Keywords:   fictitious play, Bayesian learning, evidence, statistical models

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